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 Research in moral psychology has focused on understanding what factors assist in 
the development of moral action and decision making.  Examples of these research 
factors include educational experiences (Rest et al, 1986), intelligence (Rest, 1979), and 
social networking (Derryberry & Thoma, 2000).  Personality factors facilitating moral 
judgment have also receive attention in recent years with Damon and Hart (1988) 
exploring self-understanding as a possible factor in moral judgment and Baumeister and 
Exline (1999) proposing that exercising self-control is often characteristic of those who 
often employ prosocial behavior.  Pizarro (2000) suggested that those who fail to utilize 
empathy may think about moral issues just as those who do employ empathy but find 
them easier to ignore.  This study attempted to explore this research from a different 
angle by examining the relationships between antisocial personality traits as opposed to 
prosocial personality traits.  To measure these traits, data were collected from two 
samples comprised of 120 college students and 24 prisoners from a state-inmate facility.  
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) was used to measure moral judgment and the Personality 
Assessment Inventory (PAI) was used to measure the desired personality factors. The 
results indicated that antisocial personality characteristics do not inhibit moral judgment 
development.  However, the results showed that individuals with antisocial personality 
vi 
  
characteristics were more likely to endorse self-serving decisions in situations that call 
for moral decision-making. 
vii 
  
Introduction 
Moral Judgment Development:  An Overview 
 “The function of morality is to provide a basic guideline for determining how 
conflicts in human interests are to be settled and for optimizing mutual benefit of people 
living together in groups” (Rest, Deemer, Barnett, Spickemier, & Volker, 1986, p.1).  
Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory on moral development is considered a key paradigm for 
research in moral psychology.  His original view stated that an individual’s moral 
functioning operates under one of three primary levels divided into two stages per level 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1958).  His first level, defined as the 
preconventional level, represents the stage where one’s moral reasoning centers on how 
he/she will be directly affected by the consequences of decisions.  Individuals functioning 
at this level will operate with a reasoning level oriented towards a reward-punishment 
mentality (stage 1) or “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” mentality (stage 2) 
(Colby & Kohlberg, 1987; Kohlberg, 1958).   
The next level Kohlberg proposed under which individuals operate is the 
conventional level.  Stage 3 of this level is defined by a mutual interpersonal expectation 
of relationships and interpersonal conformity.  Individuals operating under this stage 
attempt to perform the right actions because they feel that the majority of society expects 
them to and that so doing earns the approval of important others.  In stage 4, individuals 
begin placing emphasis on the social system and their conscience.  In other words, they 
begin conforming to the laws of society because they believe those are the infallible 
standards.   
1 
2 
Kohlberg’s last proposed level is known as the postconventional level.  When 
individuals achieve stage 5 of this level, their moral thinking becomes focused more on
individual rights as specified in social contracts.  They become aware of the relativity of 
group values, but respect non-relative values regardless of majority opinion.  Finally, in 
stage 6, individuals develop a perspective that revolves around universal ethical 
principles.  Ultimately, they integrate a sense of willingness to follow self-chosen 
principles even if so doing results in violations of the law.   
There has always been controversy on whether or not Kohlberg contributed to a 
strong foundation for the views on moral judgment.  His theory has been criticized for 
being too narrow (not representing the whole domain), too similar to Piaget’s theory of 
cognitive development, and more a measure of verbal ability (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & 
Thoma, 1999b).  According to Rest et al. (1999b), some have even suggested restarting 
the field from scratch rather than building on Kohlberg’s theories.  However, believing 
that his theories still lend credibility but require modification, Rest et al. (1999b) 
proposed a neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral thinking to offer answers to criticisms of 
Kohlberg’s theory.  The approach redefines Kohlberg’s moral stages, but maintains his 
core concepts.  Core concepts that the neo-Kohlbergian approach endorses include the 
emphasis on rationality, the idea that individuals self-construct their categories of 
morality, that moral thinking develops, and that individuals shift from conventional moral 
thinking to postconventional thinking.   
In advancing neo-Kohlbergian theory, Rest (see Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma, 
1999a) developed the Defining Issues Test (DIT; discussed in more detail below), which 
is an objective measurement of moral judgment with validated response items designed to 
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activate particular moral judgment developmental schema.  These include the personal 
interest, maintaining norms, and postconventional schema.  For Rest, moral judgment 
development is the product of the advancement along these three schemata such that 
reasoning from a specific schema is typically modal, though any schema can be activated.  
As such, Rest’s conception of moral judgment development is more of a soft-stage 
approach paralleling contemporary views on human development that allows for more 
flexibility in moral reasoning throughout the life course as opposed to the hard-stage 
notion (e.g., moral judgment is fixed at a specific stage) that Kohlberg advocated.   
Rest et al. (1999a) cited the DIT as measuring and confirming Rest’s schema 
theory as a result of its ability to reliably distinguish between conventional and 
postconventional thinking along with earlier forms of moral thinking (1999a).  In 
comparison to Kohlberg’s stage theory, the personal interest schema pulls elements from 
stage 2 and 3 of moral development, commonly viewed as the beginning stages for 
children (Rest et al., 1999a).  In other words, individuals who operate under the personal 
interest schema are those who endorse a system that follows punishment, obedience, and 
the actions that will serve one’s personal interest.  Because DIT research is done with 
participants 12 years or older, there is little to say about the personal interest schema 
relative to the other two schemas.  
 Kohlberg viewed individuals who operated under stages 3 and 4 of his theory as 
ones who place law and order as the greatest priority. Rest designed the maintaining 
norms schema as an alternative to Kohlberg’s stage 4.  This schema is made up of many 
components.  Individuals operating under this schema present a “need for norms.”  As 
Rest et al. (1999a) maintain, society must have a set of norms and standards for 
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cooperation among individuals.  Individuals do not need to just cooperate with 
individuals they know and are familiar with; there also needs to be a mutual 
understanding between strangers who come face-to-face.  Implementing official laws to 
regulate these encounters establishes this society-wide scope of cooperation.  These laws 
make up a uniform, categorical application known to everyone.  The law is set up so that 
no matter how individuals understand it, they are both protected by it as well as obligated 
to follow it.  The law also sets up partial reciprocity where people obey the law and 
expect that others are doing the same.  Through this system, the society in general will 
benefit from everyone’s mutual labor of doing their duty.  Rest et al. (1999a) called this a 
partial reciprocity as opposed to a “full” reciprocity because obeying the law under the 
maintaining norms schema may not serve every individual equally.   
The last component of the maintaining norms schema relates to the duty 
orientation that individuals feel for a social system.  Those who operate under the 
maintaining norms schema follow the laws of society rigidly because that is what defines 
morality for them.  Rest et al. (1999a) stated that “one must obey authorities, not 
necessarily out of respect for the personal qualities of the authority, but out of respect for 
the social system” (p. 306).  In essence, individuals define their morality through the 
order and law of society.  It is through this belief system that these individuals will 
oppose anyone who threatens the social order and, ultimately, their perceived morality. 
At the peak of moral judgment is the postconventional schema.  Rest et al. (1999a) 
defined postconventional thinking as a group of ideals that individuals share for the 
cooperation of society and that those ideals are modifiable through debate, tests of logical 
consistency, mutual acceptance, and the personal experience of those involved in the 
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community.  As with the maintaining norms schema, the postconventional schema is 
made up of four elements of reference.  The first element is related to the primacy of 
moral criteria in which an individual realizes that the standards of society are arranged in 
a fashion that stipulates the way those under those standards are to behave.  However, the 
postconventional thinker also realizes that there are exceptions to the proposed norms and 
that just because it requires that people behave a certain way does not mean that it is 
moral for a person to behave that way.  At the postconventional level, individuals see the 
laws and standards as modifiable and negotiable when they are not serving the best 
interest of the community (Rest et al., 1999a).   
The second element is that these thinkers are appealing to an ideal.  In other 
words, postconventional thinking aspires to achieve goals that create the greatest good for 
all.  Rest et al. (1999a) use examples such as guaranteeing minimal rights and protection 
for everyone, engendering caring and intimacy among people, fair treatment, providing 
for the needy, furthering the common good, and actualizing personhood to demonstrate 
that a postconventional thinker is not merely an individual who is opposing the current 
system’s establishment.  The third element of postconventional thinkers is the shareable 
ideals that they hold.  Instead of a personal intuition or ethnocentric preference, these 
individuals justify their acts by arguing that their behavior furthers the cooperation, the 
common good, and that their acts respect others.  Postconventional thinkers behave in 
such a way that is selfless because they view their behavior as promoting the overall 
well-being of everyone.   
The last element is known as full reciprocity.  Partial reciprocity of the 
maintaining norms schema proposed that society will work if everyone abides by the law.  
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However, the postconventional thinker realizes the possibility of a subjective law that 
favors certain individuals over others.  Hence, the individual under this schema argues 
that certain laws should be modified to provide equality among all individuals (Rest et al., 
1999). 
The DIT 
The Moral Judgment Interview (MJI; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) was Kohlberg’s 
primary means for assessing moral judgment development.  With the MJI, participants 
are presented with several moral dilemmas, asked to solve them, and then asked to 
provide an explanation for the reasoning behind their choices.  These interviews were 
transcribed then scored for a stage using a scoring guide of over 800 pages (Rest et al., 
1999a).  As this description implies, scoring the interview material of the MJI is arduous.  
Hence, the DIT’s multiple choice method of assessment was developed as a viable 
alternative, despite reservations from Kohlberg that rankings and ratings from 
participants were a “quick and dirty” technique that was too good to be true (Rest et al., 
1999a, p. 295).  For researchers like Kohlberg, the interview method was considered the 
primary assessment tool for understanding an individual’s moral mind.  Kohlberg 
assumed that individuals were perfectly aware of their own inner processes and would 
therefore be able to verbally explain them.  However, this method of moral assessment 
became questioned more and more over time (Rest et al., 1999a).  For example, 
researchers began to note the fallibility of self-report explanations pertaining to one’s 
own cognitive processes.  Although it was noted that Kohlberg referred to the scoring 
procedure of his interviews as error-free, reports on participants’ responses indicated their 
responses could mirror the background of the scorer.  For example, based on the 
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individual responsible for scoring interviews, some participants tended to sound like the 
philosopher John Rawls under Kohlberg, while others sounded like gender feminists 
under Carol Gilligan.       
In citing the need for a different means for assessing moral reasoning, Rest (see 
Rest et al., 1999a) argued that individuals are able to adequately report on the products of 
their cognition but less so on the mental operations they utilized to arrive at their 
conclusion.  The logic behind the development of the DIT, therefore, presumes a 
recognition task is much simpler in that individuals only discriminate between lines of 
reasoning versus producing a unique line of reasoning (Rest et al., 1999a).  One problem 
with Kohlberg’s research is postconventional thinking has rarely been scored.  Little 
evidence exists to support his stage 5 scoring, and Kohlberg himself even eliminated 
stage 6 from scoring due to lack of empirical evidence.  This was considered by many to 
be a serious problem for his theory (Rest et al., 1999a).  However, the DIT recognition 
tasks appear to have eliminated this problem, showing more instances scored at the 
postconventional level.  
The procedure to follow for individuals taking the DIT is straightforward.  
Participants read six scenarios, each containing an individual faced with a moral dilemma.  
The individuals are then asked to respond, or make an action choice, which measures 
their level of moral judgment.  Participants’ choices are limited to whether they feel the 
individual in the scenario should act on the situation, not act on the situation, or whether 
they are unable to decide.  The next step for participants is to read a list of 12 issues 
related to the dilemma and indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = great importance, 5 = no 
importance) how relevant each statement is to the choice the character makes in each 
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hypothetical scenario.  Finally, participants are asked to rank the four items in each 
dilemma that they consider most important in making their action choice.  These ratings 
and rankings provide insight into which schema (personal interest, maintaining norms, or 
postconventional) participants are primarily operating under. 
To quantify each domain the DIT measures, many indices have been researched 
over time.  For over 20 years, individuals relied on the P score to measure an individual’s 
moral development.  The P score references the number of times an individual ranks 
postconventional items as most important and, therefore, measures the extent to which an 
individual demonstrates postconventional reasoning in their responses.  However, 
research indicated two significant flaws with this index (Rest, Thoma, Narvaez, & 
Bebeau, 1997).  The first suggested that assigning numbers to Kohlbergian views created 
a quantitative vs. qualitative issue while the second indicated that because information 
from lower stage items was not used, the P score would ultimately throw away data.  Rest 
et al. (1997) compared the P index to the newer N2 index and found that N2 
outperformed P on multiple domains.  The N2 index is similar to the P score in that it 
measures the degree to which P items are prioritized.  However, in accounting for an 
individual’s rating of all items, it also contains another component that measures the 
degree to which the lower stages are rated lower than the ratings of the higher stages 
(Rest et al., 1997).  As with the P score, the N2 score will be higher for individuals who 
respond to DIT items related to postconventional thinking.  Unlike the P score, however, 
the N2 score accounts for the participant’s rating of other items.  Thus, those who rate 
items related to the postconventional schema highly and minimize their ratings of items 
pertaining to the other two schemata have the highest N2 scores.     
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The Type index, which has been developed to compensate for N2’s lack of 
information about the extent of schema mixture, scores group participants on two 
common characteristics: a) modal moral judgment schema and b) the extent of schema 
mix (Rest et al., 1999a).  Seven developmental types are noted and split into two 
categories: consolidated and transitional.  Individuals of consolidated types will utilize a 
point of view that is consistent with the predominant schema, whereas those of 
transitional types will utilize contending views from more than one schema.  Types 1, 4, 
and 7 are defined as consolidated types.  Hence, the personal interest schema is not only 
modal at type 1 but is also clearly preferred over the other two schemata; the maintaining 
norms schema is not only modal at type 4 but is also clearly preferred over the other two 
schemata; and the postconventional schema is not only modal at type 7 but is also clearly 
preferred over the other two schemata.  Types 2, 3, 5, and 6 are defined as the transitional 
types.  Although a moral judgment schema is modal for these types, the preference of a 
specific schema is not as strong among these types as is the case for consolidated types.  
At type 2, the individual is transitioning away from the personal interest moral judgment 
schema.  At type 3, the maintaining norms schema has become modal though the 
influence of the personal interest schema is still apparent.  The maintaining norms 
schema is still modal at type 5, but it is evident that the individual is starting to transition 
away from this schema as reference of items pertaining to the postconventional schema is 
increasing.  At type 6, the modal schema is the postconventional schema but the influence 
of items pertaining to the maintaining norms schema remains.   
Rest et al. (1999a) also describe other indices of importance used in the 
quantification of DIT information. These are noted as the Number of Can’t Decides 
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(NUMCD), the Utilizer score (U), the Humanitarian/Liberal Perspective (HUMLIB), 
Religious Orthodoxy (ORTHO), and Antiestablishment (A).  The NUMCD is essentially 
a count of the number of times a participant reports he/she can’t decide on which action 
to take.  The U score is a measure of the degree of fit between the importance ratings of 
items and advocacy of action. The HUMLIB variable is in place to indicate how many 
times a participant’s response is consistent with those in the highest scoring groups 
(professionals in political science and philosophy) (Thoma, 2006).  ORTHO is an index 
designed to measure the amount a participant utilizes reasoning according to religious 
orthodoxy.   The ORTHO index is in place to represent the sum of both the rates and 
ranks for Item 9 in the Doctor’s Dilemma (note: Item 9 relates to the idea that only God 
can determine who should live and die). The A score is the sum of the rating of items 
reflecting an antiestablishment attitude.  As Rest (1993) notes, “These considerations 
presuppose an understanding of Stage 4, but fault existing authorities and ‘the 
establishment’ for being hypocritical and inconsistent with its own rationale.  The ‘A’ 
point of view is critical but offers nothing positive in its place” (p. 12).   
Factors Facilitating Moral Judgment 
Over the years, research has identified a variety of factors that influence and 
contribute to the development of moral judgment such as educational experiences (Rest et 
al, 1986), intelligence (Rest, 1979), and social networking (Derryberry & Thoma, 2000).  
One area that has received increased attention in recent years is personality and aspects of 
self that pertain to or contribute to personality.  A variety of research has emerged which 
focuses on aspects of personality that appear to be positively correlated with moral 
judgment development.  For example, results from a longitudinal design on the existence 
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of a prosocial personality by Eisenberg, Guthrie, and Cumberland (2002) indicated that 
self-reported prosocial dispositions and prosocial moral reasoning on an objective 
measure of moral judgment were positively related to prosocial behavior when the 
participants were observed as preschoolers.  In another study, Wilson (1983) found that 
those who were rated at the highest stages of Kohlberg’s moral judgment rated highest on 
values such as Self-Respect, Mature Love, Logical, Independent, and Inner Harmony of 
the Rokeach Value Survey and those at the pre-conventional stages were associated with 
the hedonistic values.  In a study on the perceived personality of moral exemplars, 
Walker (1999) utilized the template for the Factor Five model (Costa & McCrae, 1992; 
Goldberg, 1993) to describe the perceived personality characteristics of moral exemplars 
(e.g., those advanced in components pertaining to advanced moral development including 
moral judgment).  The results indicated that personality traits related to 
Conscientiousness and Agreeableness were salient for moral exemplars.  In exploring 
older men and women, Lifton (1985) found that their moral judgment development was 
related to personality characteristics associated with the development of mature, balanced, 
and symbiotic senses of self and social identity. 
Aspects of self that pertain to or contribute to personality that have been explored 
in trying to account for moral judgment development include self-control, self-
understanding, and emotionality.  Baumeister and Exline (1999) examined research on 
morality and suggested that self-control operates as a “moral muscle” and is vulnerable to 
fatigue over time (p.1177).  According to Baumeister and Exline, poor self-control is 
associated with individuals who make judgments that lead to socially unacceptable 
behavior, whereas those who make judgments pertaining to prosocial behavior may 
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possess higher self control. Damon and Hart (1988) indicated that individuals develop 
self-understanding over time, causing the individual to choose important philosophical or 
moral belief systems, ideological choices, and personal goals. Ultimately, this contributes 
to the ability to form moral ideals and beliefs.  Lastly, Pizarro (2000) suggested that an 
empathic emotional response works as a “moral signal” in making everyday moral 
judgments.  In other words, although individuals without empathy are not precluded from 
moral reasoning and judgments, they can be inhibited in recognizing moral situations or 
may find it easy to ignore recognized situations calling for moral action (Pizarro).   
Statement of the Problem and Purpose of the Study 
Research demonstrates the relationship that certain personality factors have with 
advanced moral judgment development.  However, there are some aspects of personality 
that could negatively relate or work contrary to moral judgment development.  For 
example, it is plausible to hypothesize that certain personality characteristics pertaining to 
anti-social behavior (specifically anti-social personality traits as defined by the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-4th Edition -Text Revised, 2000, 
discussed later) could relate to an individual’s failure to either advance in or utilize his or 
her moral judgment development.  To date, moral judgment research has yet to examine 
this possibility. Thus, the following research question is presented:  How do antisocial 
personality characteristics relate to moral judgment development?  In asking this 
question, the goal of the study is to determine if there is inferential evidence supporting 
that certain aspects pertaining to personality could undermine moral judgment 
development.   
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As noted previously, there are a variety of personality characteristics and factors 
related to personality that have positive relationships with moral judgment development.  
At the same time, just as aspects of personality may serve to facilitate moral judgment 
development, other aspects of personality could be a detriment to moral judgment 
development.  If one observes the DSM-IV-TR criteria for Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, there appear to be personality traits and behaviors that are quite the opposite of 
what is considered moral aptitude and behavior.  Currently, the diagnostic criteria for 
Antisocial Personality Disorder include “a pervasive pattern of disregard for the rights of 
others that begins in childhood and early adolescence and continues into adulthood” 
(DSM-IV-TR, 2000, p. 701).  Antisocial Personality Disorder falls under Cluster B (also 
known as the emotional, dramatic, and erratic disorders) of the Personality Disorders.  At 
the center of this personality is a pattern of deceit and manipulation for self-serving 
reasons.  Though the diagnosis of this personality disorder is only given to individuals 18 
and above, children who display the same behaviors are diagnosed with Conduct 
Disorder (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).   
 From a Neo-Kohlbergian point of view, individuals manifesting behaviors leading 
to the diagnosis of Antisocial Personality or Conduct Disorder would be expected to be 
operating according to the personal interest schema.  Those who are diagnosed with 
Antisocial Personality Disorder usually fail to conform to the norms and laws of society 
and have no problem breaking laws, such as destroying property the property of others, 
stealing, and becoming involved with illegal operations.  For unexplained reasons, it 
appears that these individuals fail either to a) advance in their moral judgment 
development or b) utilize their moral judgment ability.  In their interactions with other 
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individuals, those with this disorder fail to show any regard for the feelings, rights, and 
wishes of the other.  Instead, they manipulate and deceive these individuals for the sole 
purpose of obtaining some personal gain such as money or sex (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  
They are also likely to engage in physical fights and perform acts of assault on other 
individuals.  It is also likely that individuals with this disorder are involved in spouse and 
child beatings (DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder act 
very impulsively and make decisions without considering how it might affect those 
around them (such as changing jobs or relationships quickly, DSM-IV-TR, 2000).  
Financially, they are irresponsible and they often engage in reckless behavior that will 
likely bring harmful consequences.  Upon creating harm in the lives of other individuals, 
they will often respond with an indifferent attitude and make apathetic statements such as 
“life’s unfair” and “they had it coming.”  They will usually attempt to justify their actions 
by blaming the victim for being helpless and deserving of what was coming.  Individuals 
with Antisocial Personality Disorder have a very self-centered perspective and explain 
that the only person they will help is “number one” (DSM-IV-TR, 2000) 
 Individuals with Antisocial Personality Disorder are generally described as 
“psychopaths” and “sociopaths.”  Many of them have a very arrogant and inflated sense 
of the self and feel that the things most people do are “below them.”  The infamous Ted 
Bundy is a classic example of this description.  His noted lack of empathy towards his 
victims and inflated ego as he defended himself during his murder trial were key 
components in his criminality.  Generally, those who are diagnosed with Antisocial 
Personality Disorder are described as having a lack of empathy, inflated self-appraisal, 
superficial charm, and a complete disregard for social norms.  They are typically very 
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poor parents and caretakers and generally leave those they are responsible for helpless.  
For example, a child may become malnourished or an elder’s needs may become 
neglected (DSM-IV-TR, 2000). 
 Given what we understand about moral judgment development, it is possible to 
predict that there are personality factors associated with Antisocial Personality Disorder 
that could relate to an individual’s failure to either advance in or utilize his or her moral 
judgment development.  Therefore, the purpose of the present study is to examine how 
characteristics similar to the traits described in Antisocial Personality Disorder may relate 
to the a) result in a failure to advance in moral judgment development and b) failure to 
utilize one’s moral judgment ability.  In exploring the first possibility, antisocial 
personality characteristics are compared to DIT N2 and Type scores.  Significant 
negative relationships will be required in order to infer that antisocial personality 
characteristics are linked to detriments in moral judgment development.  In exploring the 
second scenario, antisocial personality characteristics will be compared to DIT U, 
ORTHO, HUMLIB, NUMCD, and A scores.  Affirmation of this second possibility will 
require significant negative relationships among antisocial personality characteristics and 
U, ORTHO, and HUMLIB; a negligible relationship with NUMCD scores; and a positive 
significant relationship with A scores.  
 
 Method 
Participants 
 College Students.  Participants included 120 college students who volunteered 
through the Department of Psychology’s Study Board at a large Southeastern regional 
public comprehensive university.  College students were offered extra-credit as incentive 
for completing the research.  The sample of college students excluded 13 participants due 
to failure to pass reliability checks or failure to complete the measures fully. Of the 
sample, 32 identified their gender as male and 75 identified their gender as female. Of 
those who identified their class year, 78 indicated freshman, 15 indicated sophomore, 
nine reported junior, four reported senior, and one reported other. In terms of ethnicity, 
89 classified themselves as white, 10 as black, three as Hispanic, three as other, and two 
as Indian.  The average age of the sample was 19.36 years (SD = 2.86).   
Prisoners.   Participants also included 24 prisoners, part of a state-inmate program, 
who volunteered to contribute to the research.  However, 17 failed to pass reliability 
checks or did not complete the measures in full.  Hence, only data from seven 
participants were included in the final sample.  Of these seven participants, two reported 
that their gender was male, and five reported that their gender was female. In regards to 
ethnicity, six reported themselves to be white and one indicated black. The average age of 
the sample was 35.14 years (SD = 8.15). 
Measures 
 Demographics questionnaire.  Participants were asked to indicate their age, 
gender, grade point average (GPA), ACT score, education level, and ethnicity.   
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Personality Measure.  Individuals completed a personality measure known as the 
Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 1991).  On the PAI, participants read 
statements and respond to how accurately each statement describes their personality.  In 
responding to each item, participants have five response choices:  Strongly Agree, Agree, 
Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree.  The PAI is designed to measure a variety of 
clinical variables.  Such clinical variables include Depression (DEP), Anxiety (ANX), 
Mania (MAN), Paranoia (PAR), Schizophrenia (SCZ), and features of Axis II disorders 
such as Borderline Personality Disorder (BOR), and Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(ANT).  Given that the focus of the current study is on the correlation between moral 
judgment development and antisocial personality factors, scores on the PAI’s Antisocial 
Features scale (ANT) and its designated subscales are the focus of the study.   
Once an individual’s raw score has been calculated for each PAI subscale, it is 
then translated into a T-score.  T-scores of 50 to 69 are considered within normal range 
and represent the population who displays specific traits of the feature, but not enough to 
warrant clinical significance.  T-scores below 50 represent populations who display little 
or no characteristics.  Finally, T-scores 70 and above are considered clinically significant 
and suggest that individuals in this range display multiple symptoms characteristic of the 
specific clinical variable.     
The ANT scale of the PAI is comprised of three subscales of 8 items each which 
tap into different facets of antisocial personality.  The first subscale, known as Antisocial 
Behaviors (ANTA), will be elevated for individuals who have a history of antisocial acts 
and have been involved in illegal activities such as theft, destruction of property, and 
physical aggression.  These individuals have often manifested Conduct Disorder during 
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adolescence.  The PAI measures traits on this scale from responses to statements such as 
“I like to see how much I can get away with” and “I’ve never taken money or property 
that wasn’t mine.”    
The second subscale, Ego-centric (ANTE), is elevated for individuals who display 
little regard for others.  They can be described as individuals who take advantage of 
others and feel little responsibility for the property of others.  They are also unlikely to 
feel any remorse for past transgressions and place little importance on their role as spouse, 
parent, or employee.  Responses to statements such as “I’ve borrowed money without 
paying it back” and “I’ll take advantage of others if they leave themselves open to it” 
indicate an individual’s level of ego-centricity.  
 Finally, Stimulus-Seeking (ANTS) represents individuals who manifest behavior 
in a manner that is dangerous to both themselves and/or those around them.  These 
individuals also crave excitement and are easily bored by routine and convention.  This 
scale is measured by the responses to statements such as “I get a kick out of doing 
dangerous things” and “I do a lot of wild things just for the thrill of it.”  It should be 
noted that individuals must be elevated (T score >70) on at least two of the three stated 
subscales for a diagnosis of Antisocial Personality Disorder to be considered. 
Development of the PAI generated descriptive statistics from three different 
samples:  Census-matched standardization, College, and Clinical.  The Census-matched 
standardization sample (N = 1,000) acquired a M = 4.99 (T score = 50) and a SD = 4.42 
(T score = 48) for the ANT-A subscale, a M = 3.43 (T score = 49) and a SD = 3.01 (T 
score = 49) for the ANT-E subscale, and a M = 4.74 (T score = 51) and SD = 3.66 (T 
score = 48) for the ANT-S subscale.  The college sample (N = 1,051) acquired a M = 6.34 
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(T score = 49) and SD = 4.71 (T score = 47) for the ANT-A subscale, a M = 4.97 (T score 
= 50) and SD = 3.16 (T score = 44) for the ANT-E scale, and a M = 7.61 (T score = 51) 
and SD = 4.35 (T score = 42) for the ANT-S scale.  Finally, the clinical sample (N = 
1,265) patients acquired a M = 8.31 (T score = 49) and SD = 5.80 (T score = 44) on the 
ANT-A subscale, a M = 4.46 (T score = 49) and SD = 3.45 (T score = 46) on the ANT-E 
subscale, and a M = 6.10 (T score = 50) and SD = 4.52 (T score = 48) on the ANT-S 
subscale (Morey, 1991).  Though the data for the sample were standardized using T-
scores, the current study will run analyses using raw scores because it is a non-clinical 
sample.     
According to Morey (1991), the internal consistency for the ANT-A subscale 
generated an α = .73 for the census sample, α = .76 for the college sample, and α = .80 for 
clinical sample.  For the ANT-E, the results indicated an α = .63 for all three samples.  
Finally, the ANT-S resulted in an α = .69 for the census sample, α = .77 for the college 
sample, and α = .75 for the clinical sample.  Test-retest reliability coefficients for the 
combined samples of community and college yielded r = .83 for the ANT-A subscale, r 
= .75 for the ANT-E subscale, and r = .85 for the ANT-S subscale (Morey).  For the 
present study, the college sample yielded an α = .74 for the ANTA, α = .60 for ANTE, 
and an α = .70 for ANTS. 
Moral Judgment:  The Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & 
Thoma, 1999) was used to assess participants’ moral judgment.  The DIT is a measure 
administered in multiple-choice format that presents six moral dilemmas for a main 
character.  The participants are asked to indicate the action choice they feel is most 
appropriate for the main character.  The response choices indicate whether or not the 
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character should act on the situation or if the participant is unable to decide on the proper 
choice.  The participant is then faced with 12 issues related to each dilemma and asked to 
rate each issue or statement on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = great importance, 5 = no importance) 
in terms of its importance to the decision made about the main character.  The projected 
indices to measure will be those previously discussed, which are N2, Type, U, HUMLIB, 
ORTHO, and A.  Scores for the N2 index range from 0 to 95, with scores towards the 
higher end indicating a tendency to make decisions under the postconventional schema.  
The Type index ranges from 1 to 7.    
Types 1 and 2 are modal at the personal interest schema; Types 3, 4, and 5 are 
modal at the maintaining norms schema; and Types 6 and 7 are modal at the 
postconventional schema.  Types 1, 4, and 7 represent consolidated phases of moral 
judgment development while Types 2, 3, 5, and 6 represent transitional phases of moral 
judgment development (see the earlier discussion of Type index).  The scores for the U 
index range from -1 to 1.  Scores closer to 1 indicate a greater likelihood of the utilization 
of the modal moral judgment schema.  Scores for HUMLIB range from 0 (no matches) to 
6 (all matches).  ORTHO scores include a range from 1 (lowest) to 9 (highest).  Finally, 
A scores range from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicative of antiestablishment attitudes.   
Rest et al. (1999a) indicated that the test-retest reliability for the DIT has been 
reported to range from r = .70 to r = .80. Depending on the index, Cronbach’s alpha for 
the DIT has ranged from the high .70’s to the low .80’s for the past 20 years, which is 
considered adequate (Rest et al., 1999).   In evaluating the internal consistency of the DIT 
in the current study, Cronbach’s α’s were computed at the item-level for each schema 
(e.g., consideration of the consistency across DIT rating items specific to particular moral 
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judgment schema), as Crowson, DeBacker, Derryberry, and Thoma (2006) recently 
recommended.  For the present study, internal consistency is low to acceptable at each 
schema, with α = .81 for the postconventional schema, α = .52 for the maintaining norms 
schema, and α = .76 for the personal interest schema.  
Procedure   
Participants from the college sample volunteered to be a part of the study via the 
department’s online study board.  Participants from the prisoner sample volunteered after 
the researcher contacted the inmate facility’s state-inmate program coordinator.  College 
students were administered the measurements in a college classroom at different times of 
the day.   
Before attempting to gather data from a prisoner population, the state-inmate 
facility with the desired population was contacted.  The chief jailor’s assistant indicated 
that the prisoners would be asked if they would be willing to volunteer their free time to 
participate in a psychological study.  The prisoners were offered no incentive to 
participate and were told that they would be allowed to quit anytime they wished.  
Prisoners were gathered as a group into a conference room in the county jail to be 
administered their portion of the assessment.  At the beginning of each session the 
researcher thoroughly explained the procedure.  Participants then read and signed an 
informed consent document explaining the procedure prior to the administration of the 
preceding measurements.  Participants first completed a copy of the DIT to assess for 
their level of moral judgment.  Participants then completed the PAI to assess their clinical 
personality characteristics.  When completed, the participants turned in their responses to 
the researcher.  Data from each participant were placed in a folder and designated a 
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number.  Informed consent documents were separated from their data to ensure 
anonymity.
 
 Results 
 Descriptive information for the college students, prisoners, and those with 
clinically elevated PAI scores can be found in Table 1.  In terms of DIT scores, no major 
anomalies or unexpected occurrences were present in the college student sample.  It is 
interesting to note that those scoring in the “clinically elevated” range of the antisocial 
scale had similar means and standard deviations, relative to both the college and prisoner 
sample, on both the developmental and non-developmental DIT indices. DIT Type and 
N2 scores indicate that both the college students and the prisoners were modal at the 
maintaining norms schema.  Though both were similar in terms of their modal moral 
judgment schema, it is interesting to note that DIT Type scores support that the college 
students were consolidated upon the maintaining norms schema, whereas the prisoners 
were transitioning towards the maintaining norms schema (Rest, 1993, Rest et al.,1999a 
Thoma, 2006).  DIT NUMCD score means suggest that participants were decisive in their 
action choices and had minimal difficulty in deciding upon an action choice.  The low 
DIT HUMLIB means denote that the action choice responses of most participants in the 
sample were not reflective of the humanitarian/liberal perspective on moral issues and are 
typical of those with conventional Type scores (i.e., 3 to 5; Thoma, 2006).  DIT ORTHO 
means reflect a moderate influence of religious orthodoxy in moral decision making 
among most participants.  DIT U score means support that the action choices and ratings 
of the majority of the sample were neither predominantly consistent nor inconsistent.  
DIT A score means indicate that antiestablishment attitudes for most in the sample were 
low, though it is interesting to note that the A scores of the prisoners were advanced 
relative to the college students.         
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of the Participants   
  
College Students 
 
(N =107 ) 
Prisoners 
 
(N =7 ) 
Clinically Elevated 
 
(N = 8) 
Index M SD M SD M SD 
 
Type 
 
4.19 1.80 3.14 1.68 4.75 1.91 
NUMCD 
 
1.03 .94 1.00 .00 1.13 .99 
HUMLIB 
 
2.67 1.25 2.43 .79 3.13 1.36 
ORTHO 
 
5.76 2.88 5.29 2.21 6.13 3.60 
U 
 
.16 .14 .03 .09 .16 .14 
N2 
 
32.71 13.27 21.30 8.75 31.36 15.62 
A 
 
1.73 2.36 3.00 2.31 3.88 3.76 
ANTA 
 
5.31 4.49 11.29 3.59 15.13 3.94 
ANTE 
 
4.31 3.10 3.86 3.39 9.86 2.90 
ANTS 
 
6.43 3.92 10.57 6.16 14.75 3.92 
Note: Type = Defining Issues Test (DIT) index of schema and developmental phase, NUMCD = DIT 
Number of Can’t Decides scores, ORTHO = DIT Religious/Orthodoxy scores, U = DIT Utilitarianism 
scores, N2 = DIT Developmental scores, A = DIT Antisocial scores, ANTA = PAI Antisocial: Antisocial 
Behavior subscale score, ANTE = PAI Antisocial: Egocentricity subscale score, ANTS = PAI Antisocial: 
Stimulation seeking subscale score. 
For PAI ANT indices, the clinically elevated sample falls within the normal range 
of the ANT subscale scores.  The ANT subscale data also appears within the normal 
expected range for college students taking the PAI.  Mean scores for the prisoner 
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participants appear within the normal range for the ANTE subscale, but appear slightly 
elevated for both the ANTA and ANTS subscales (Morey, 1991). 
Table 2 
 
Correlations among DIT and PAI scores 
 
 Type NUMCD HUMLIB ORTHO U 
Type 1.00     
NUMCD .031 1.00    
HUMLIB .099     -.323** 1.00   
ORTHO   -.268** -.008   -.334** 1.00  
U .039 -.088 .054  .105 1.00 
N2     .756** -.097 .176 -.189      .267** 
A .166 -.116   .210*     -.394** -.052 
ANTA .075 -.013 .181 -.095  .066 
ANTE .061 -.009    .228**  -.222*      .225** 
ANTS .077  .130 .196 -.131 -.064 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
 N2 A ANTa ANTe ANTs 
N2 1.00     
A .100 1.00    
ANTA .114    .329** 1.00   
ANTE -.011 .217*     .410** 1.00  
ANTS -.049  .223**     .434**     .498** 1.00 
 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the .001 level.  * Correlation is significant at the .05 level. 
Note: Type = Defining Issues Test (DIT) index of schema and developmental phase, NUMCD = DIT 
Number of Can’t Decides scores, ORTHO = DIT Religious/Orthodoxy scores, U = DIT Utilitarianism 
scores, N2 = DIT Developmental scores, A = DIT Antisocial scores, ANTA = PAI Antisocial: Antisocial 
Behavior subscale score, ANTE = PAI Antisocial: Egocentricity subscale score, ANTS = PAI Antisocial: 
Stimulation seeking subscale score. 
 
Table 2 addresses correlations among the considered indices among the college 
participants.  As indicated below, various significant correlations existed.  Most 
significant correlations were among the DIT indices and among the PAI indices.  
However, significant correlations also appear between certain DIT indices and ANT 
subscales including, ANTE and HUMLIB, ANTE and ORTHO, ANTA and A, ANTE 
and A, ANTS and A, and ANTE and U.        
As a result of the various relationships observed in Table 2, regression analyses 
were conducted in order to determine the degree to which PAI scores accounted for 
variance in each of the considered DIT indices (see Table 3).   As Table 3 illustrates, 
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there were some instances in which ANT scores accounted for a significant amount of 
variance in DIT scores.  This was the case for U scores, where both the ANTE and ANTS 
subscales provided significant contributions, and A scores, where ANTA subscale was a 
significant contributor. 
Given the trends observed between U and ANTE scores (see Tables 2 and 3) 
variance, additional analyses were conducted among the college students.  As noted 
earlier, U scores refer to the consistency of action choices in concert with item ratings.  
Consequently, this index provides a useful inference for predicting moral behavior (see 
Rest, 1993).  As also noted earlier, those with high ANTE scores display little regard for 
others or the property of others, do not feel remorse for past transgressions, and place 
little importance on their role as spouse, parent, or employee.  Hence, both of these 
indices provide valuable information about participants’ action choices.  Therefore, one-
way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were performed among most of the DIT dilemma 
action choices in order to determine if there were statistically significant differences in 
ANTE scores.  Such analyses were necessary in order to determine if particular action 
choices were associated with advanced ANTE scores.  Table 4 reveals the findings of 
these analyses.   
Table 3 
 
Summary of Regression Analyses 
  B SE B β t Sig.* 
Type ANTA 
ANTE 
ANTS 
 .019 
 .010 
-.022 
.045 
.068 
.054 
.047 
.018 
-.048 
 .414 
 .152 
-.404 
.680 
.880 
.687 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
NUMCD ANTA 
ANTE 
ANTS 
-.014 
-.025 
 .048 
.023 
.035 
.028 
-.067 
-.082 
  .200 
-.598 
-.708 
1.707 
.551 
.481 
.091 
HUMLIB ANTA 
ANTE 
ANTS 
.023 
.061 
.027 
.030 
.046 
.037 
.082 
.152 
.085 
   .749 
1.343 
   .741 
.455 
.182 
.460 
ORTHO ANTA 
ANTE 
ANTS 
-.002 
-.195 
-.020 
.571 
.106 
.085 
-.003 
-.210 
-.027 
   .023 
-1.835 
  -.236 
.982 
.069 
.814 
U ANTA 
ANTE 
ANTS 
  .001 
  .015 
-.009 
.003 
.005 
.004 
 .033 
 .332 
-.243 
-.303 
  2.941 
-2.141 
.762 
.004 
.035 
N2 ANTA 
ANTE 
ANTS 
  .411 
-.379 
-.114 
.338 
.507 
.399 
.138 
-.088 
-.034 
1.215 
-.747 
-.286 
.227 
.457 
.775 
A ANTA 
ANTE 
ANTS 
.142 
.054 
.042 
.056 
.084 
.067 
.270 
.071 
.071 
2.547 
 .644 
.633 
.014 
.521 
.528 
Note: Type = Defining Issues Test (DIT) index of schema and developmental phase, NUMCD = DIT 
Number of Can’t Decides scores, ORTHO = DIT Religious/Orthodoxy scores, U = DIT Utilitarianism 
scores, N2 = DIT Developmental scores, A = DIT Antisocial scores, ANTA = PAI Antisocial: Antisocial 
Behavior subscale score, ANTE = PAI Antisocial: Egocentricity subscale score, ANTS = PAI Antisocial: 
Stimulation seeking subscale score. * Bonferroni’s adjustment – p < .007. 
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In consideration of the ANTE score choices on Heinz and the Drug action choices, 
significant differences were found (F [2, 104] =3.47 p = .035, η2 = .062).  A Least 
Significant Difference (LSD) post hoc test revealed a difference between those who 
chose “Should steal” versus “Should not steal” (p = .016).  A Bonferonni post hoc test 
also revealed the same thing (p = .048)  No significant differences were found for ANTE 
scores among the Escaped Prisoner action choices (F [2, 103] = .557, p = .575, η2 
= .011).  For ANTE scores and the Newspaper action choices, no significant differences 
were present (F [2, 104] = 2.33, p = .102, η2 = .043).  No significant differences were 
seen for ANTE scores among the Doctor’s Dilemma action choices (F [2, 103] = 2.46, p 
= .090, η2 = .046).  The large majority of participants selected “should hire Mr. Lee” on 
the Webster dilemma (See Table 4).  Thus, it was not prudent to statistically consider the 
differences in ANTE scores among the differing answering choices.  It is interesting to 
note that ANTE scores were elevated among those that were undecided and those that 
selected “should not hire Mr. Lee.”   Finally, significant differences were found on 
ANTE scores among the Student Take-Over action choices (F [2, 102] = 4.26, p = .017, 
η2 = .077).  A LSD post hoc test revealed significance between the “Should Take Over” 
and the “Should Not Take Over” responses (p = .015). A Bonferroni post hoc test also 
revealed a significant difference between the two (.044).  
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Table 4 
ANTE Scores per Dilemma Action Choice    
 Should … Can’t Decide Should Not … 
 Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N 
Heinz and 
the Drug1
5.00 3.35 41 4.86 3.14 22 3.39 3.10 44 
Escaped 
Prisoner2
4.61 3.36 46 3.83 2.79 29 4.35 3.06 31 
Newspaper3 3.67 2.43 31 2.71 1.89 7 4.75 3.38 69 
Doctor’s 
Dilemma4 
5.29 3.36 31 3.59 2.60 29 4.13 3.15 46 
Webster 5 4.11 2.91 98 6.67 3.61 6 9.00 5.66 2 
Student 
Take-Over6 
5.69 3.42 16 5.42 3.15 12 3.71 2.74 77 
 
Note: 1Should/should not steal the drug; 2 Should/should not report him; : 3  Should/should not allow the 
students to publish the articles;  4 Should/should not administer the drug;  5 Should/should not have hired 
Mr. Lee; : 6 Should/should not take over the building.  
 
 Discussion 
 
 In researching the relationship between antisocial personality factors and moral 
judgment, it is important to note that no previous research on this topic was found prior to 
this study.  Thus, this study attempts to set the foundation for future research on similar 
topics.  The research question this study pursues is: How do antisocial personality 
characteristics relate to moral judgment development?  The research question at hand 
addresses the possibility that just as prosocial personality factors positively relate to 
reasoning and judgments on moral dilemmas (Goldberg, 1993; Lifton, 1985, Walker, 
1999), the inverse could occur where antisocial personality factors are concerned.     
  This study relied on bivariate correlations (see Table 2) and regression (see 
Table 3) in order to consider how PAI subscales of antisocial personality (i.e., ANTE, 
ANTS, and ANTA) related to DIT developmental indices (i.e., Type and N2) and DIT 
non-developmental indices (i.e., NUMCD, ORTHO, U, A, and HUMLIB).  As Tables 2 
and 3 support, no significant relationships emerged between any of the PAI ANT scores 
and the DIT developmental indices.  In regards to the first hypothesis, this indicates a 
possibility that antisocial personality characteristics assessed by the PAI do not inhibit 
moral judgment development.  In essence, this provides us with a clue as to how these 
personality factors pertain to moral judgment.  This finding is particularly important 
given that the previous research by Goldberg (1993), Lifton (1985), and Walker (1999) 
have indicated that prosocial personalities characteristics contribute to moral judgment 
development.  Therefore, future research may want to further delve into what it is about 
prosocial characteristics that advance moral judgment development and account for why 
it is that the inverse does not occur with antisocial characteristics.   
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Correlations between the non-developmental DIT indices and ANT scores 
revealed some significant relationships (See Table 2).  Specifically, statistically 
significant correlations were found between ANTE scores and the ORTHO, HUMLIB, A, 
and U indices.  Significant correlations also existed for the ANTS and ANTA subscales 
with DIT A scores.  In order to determine if ANT scores accounted for a significant 
portion of variance for these indices, regression analyses were conducted.  Where the 
ORTHO index was concerned, ANT subscales did not provide a significant contribution 
to variance.  Hence, though a significant negative correlation between ANTE and 
ORTHO existed, its magnitude was not large enough to result in a significant amount of 
shared variance.  Therefore, the presence of antisocial personality characteristics are not 
enough to statistically predict a decrease in a person utilizing reasoning based on 
religious or other culturally influenced ideologies (and vice versa).  This finding raises an 
interesting possibility.  Though the lack of clinically elevated antisocial personalities 
make it difficult to predict how this index is influenced by antisocial personality disorder, 
it may still be possible that religious cultural ideologies affect the manifestation of 
antisocial characteristics in situations where they would otherwise be prevalent.  In other 
words, participants raised in a highly religious environment may have antisocial 
tendencies suppressed in specific situations.  Indeed, this possibility is supported by the 
biopsychosocial approach, which is an important theoretical explanation of behavioral 
problems and abnormal psychology.  According to the biopsychosocial approach, 
behavioral problems are the product of the interaction of biological, psychological, and 
social factors.  Hence, it may be that the social influence of religious or other cultural 
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ideologies might be enough to prevent biological predispositions towards antisocial 
personality from manifesting into individual behavior.    
In regards to the HUMLIB index, ANT subscales provided no significant 
contribution to variance.  It should be noted that the significant correlation between 
ANTE and HUMLIB scores was positive, which was counter to what was expected.  
Though chance is always a possibility in an unexpected correlation such as this, it is also 
possible that those manifesting antisocial personality characteristics may have endorsed 
items that those with a humanitarian liberal perspective also endorse but for differing 
reasons.  One possibility may be that those with elevated characteristics may see some 
self-serving interest within items that characterize the humanitarian liberal perspective.  
For example, choosing to have Heinz steal the drug can be a result of both a humanitarian 
liberal ideology (the preservation of human life) and an tendency towards antisocial 
behavior (the druggist deserves to be robbed, my wife has duties she must do for me, etc).  
Another possibility may be that, when those with antisocial characteristics see no 
opportunity for personal gain, they may rate items that pertain to the humanitarian liberal 
perspective as important either by default or due to an exaggerated since of self- 
importance.    Regardless of these possibilities, the regression analysis is important to 
note because it acknowledges that antisocial personality traits do not statistically predict 
the likelihood that participants will endorse the humanitarian liberal perspective, which 
supports that those with high ANTE scores are not receptive to all of the items 
comprising the humanitarian liberal perspective.     
Regression analyses revealed stronger relationships among ANT scores and the 
DIT A and U indices.  Where DIT A scores were concerned, the ANTA scores 
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contributed a significant amount of shared variance.  Specifically, the relationship 
between the ANTA subscale and the A index indicates that those reporting higher levels 
of antisocial behavior were statistically more likely to rate antiestablishment attitudes 
regarding social issues as important on the DIT.  This finding does not reveal any 
surprises as the antiestablishment items are inherently antisocial.  Thus, it makes sense 
that those reporting higher levels of antisocial behavior would endorse an 
antiestablishment attitude.     
For DIT U scores, both ANTE and ANTS scores provided significant 
contributions to variance.  These contributions suggest that antisocial characteristics can 
statistically increase the chances that certain action choices will correspond with certain 
issues that are advocated or rated as important on the DIT.  This also makes sense as 
those with Antisocial Personality Disorder are described as those who are more self-
serving and have no issue with stealing or vandalizing.  For example, in both the Student 
Take-Over and Heinz and the Drug dilemmas, there are opportunities to break the law for 
various reasons related to both the ANTE (He deserves what he’s getting) and ANTS 
(It’ll give me a rush).  
The significant positive correlations and betas observed between U and ANTE 
scores are recognized as an important finding. As previously stated, the U score is in 
place to measure the degree of fit between the importance rating items and the advocacy 
of action choices (Rest et al, 1999b).  Recall that ANTE scores represent the level of 
egocentricity an individual’s personality manifests.  In other words, individuals with high 
scores on this subscale have often acted without regarding the impact it may have on 
others.  Since both variables have implications pertaining to moral action, investigation of 
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whether specific action choices are associated with increases or decreases in ANTE 
scores was warranted.  Thus, further analyses involving five one-way ANOVAs were 
conducted in order to account for differences in ANTE scores among the differing action 
choices for each dilemma (Table 4).   
Significant differences in ANTE scores were seen among action choices for the 
Heinz and the Drug and Student Take-Over dilemmas.  On the Heinz and the Drug 
dilemma, LSD post hoc tests revealed that those who responded with “Should Steal the 
Drug” had significantly higher ANTE scores than those that responded with “Should Not 
Steal the Drug.”  On the Student Take-Over dilemma, those who supported “Should Take 
Over” had significantly higher ANTE scores than did those who supported “Should Not 
Take Over.”  The ANTE scores on the action choices for the Webster dilemma should 
also be noted.  Though it was not possible to address these differences statistically due to 
the disparate number of participants that selected “Should hire Mr. Lee,” the results are 
consistent with the trends noted on the two previous dilemmas.   
 It is important to distinguish the nature of the decisions made in these scenarios as 
opposed to other scenarios. The action choices in these dilemmas possess the essence of 
self-serving opportunities in some form or fashion, whereas the other scenarios are 
situations in which no apparent self-serving goal would be served, regardless of the 
decision made. For example, in the Heinz and the Drug dilemma, participants may 
choose the option “Should Steal the Drug” because they feel that the pharmacist is so 
greedy he deserves to be robbed.  When describing the personal interest schema, Rest et 
al (1999a) stated that individuals operating from this schema may choose “Should Steal 
the Drug” because Heinz needs his wife to get better so she can continue to provide her 
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necessary duties as a wife for him.  In a similar vein, this action choice may be appealing 
to those possessing the characteristics that the ANTE score assesses.   
In the “Student Take-Over” scenario, self-serving reasons for taking over the 
administration building may include thoughts such as, “The president deserves this for 
disagreeing with what everyone else thinks,” or even, “This could gain me public 
exposure.” Thus, it is plausible to suggest that those with elevated ANTE scores 
responded with “Should Steal the Drug” and “Should Take-Over” because making these 
decisions would fulfill a specific self-serving purpose.  These data, therefore, provide 
initial confirmation that those scoring high on ANTE scale will have a tendency to make 
self-serving decisions in a situation that calls for moral judgment.  In short, this 
information provides important clues concerning this study’s research question in that it 
offers insight regarding the types of moral decisions that those with elevated antisocial 
personality characteristics are likely to make.   
Limitations  
As with any study, the research involved in this current investigation is not 
without its shortcomings.  Given the fact that this study explores new domains, drawing 
absolute conclusions with the limited data should be cautioned.  The primary limitation to 
this study is the lack of clinically elevated antisocial personality disorders in the data pool.  
The prisoner sample proved to be similar to the college sample in many different 
categories and, thus, provided the research with little variance.  This is a limitation 
mainly because the lack of variance makes it difficult to predict just how those with 
antisocial personality disorder will think about moral dilemmas. 
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Though the sample included prisoners, the number of prisoners relative to the 
number of college students was quite small.  The initial sample was taken from a state-
inmate facility, which only houses an average of 30 to 40 inmates.  In addition, many of 
the prisoners appeared to begin randomly responding to the measurements after a short 
period of time.  Collecting data from a larger source of incarcerated individuals may 
create more opportunity for variance in future studies.   
Another factor to consider in future studies is the administration time of the two 
measurements.  Although a relatively large amount of data was excluded from the final 
pool due to a failure to pass reliability checks, a great deal of the prisoner data was 
excluded simply due to a failure to complete the measurements.  Hence, future efforts in 
this direction may wish to reduce the administration time by using less time-consuming 
measurements such as the short-format DIT, which requires participants to read and 
respond to three rather than six dilemmas.  
Another limitation may be related to the influence of DIT responding to the PAI.  
After individuals spent a significant time reading and responding to a number of moral 
scenarios, they may have been less likely to endorse PAI items related to Antisocial 
behavior.  In future studies, reversing the administration order or incorporating some 
form of counterbalancing; (i.e., an unrelated survey to reset their style of thinking from 
the DIT) may help to prevent this limitation.   
Finally, the Cronbach’s alpha for the maintaining norms schema emerged lower 
than expected.  In consideration of the other two schema, which emerged as acceptable 
figures, the lower maintaining norms Cronbach’s alpha likely represents the response 
pattern from a number of participants who are transitioning towards or away from the 
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maintaining schema and, thus, were responding inconsistently on items related to the 
maintaining norms schema. 
This study presents opportunities for pursuing research into a completely new 
domain of how moral judgment develops.  Future research should continue to develop 
this topic with a variety of approaches.  As with any study, it is important to create the 
opportunity for as much variance in the data as possible.  Thus, future research should 
collect data from as many relevant populations as possible.  Any prison, jail, or state-
inmate facility is appropriate.  It is also recommended that no age restrictions be placed 
on future research.  Gathering data from in-patient facilities that specialize in the 
treatment of adolescents with behavioral disorders is likely to contribute to variance as 
well.   
The DIT should also continue to be the primary tool when measuring moral 
judgment development in the future.  Given the numerous research and validation studies 
completed with the DIT, as well as the conclusions drawn in regard to its ability to 
measure an individual’s level of moral thinking, the DIT continues to be a viable option 
when measuring moral judgment.  However, as a result of a significant level of attrition, 
the short-form DIT should be considered in future studies with a similar administration 
structure.  This study addresses moral judgment; however, Rest et al. (1999a) indicate 
that moral judgment is but one component of moral development.  Future studies should 
explore the possible relationship that antisocial personality factors may have with other 
components including moral sensitivity, moral motivation, and moral 
character/implementation.  More flexibility can be exercised, however, when dealing 
with personality characteristics.   
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Although the PAI is a viable tool when measuring personality, there are a great 
number of tools available when measuring personality characteristics and the possibility 
of using others should not be ruled out.  Should measurements such as the PAI be used 
again, it may be practical to consider other Axis-II personality factors and their 
relationship with moral judgment as well.  Proper measures should also be put in place to 
lower the number of excluded data as a result of a failure to pass reliability checks.  Such 
measures could include a short-form reliability check before the initial administration to 
assess for any random responders or a contract in which participants agree to answer each 
item honestly.  
Finally, it is recommended that those investigating this topic in the future should 
adjust the administration of the testing items accordingly when dealing with a population 
such as state-inmates.  Although the college participants were able to complete the 
measurements in approximately an hour, the prisoner participants took between two to 
three hours before completing or giving up on the study all together.  As mentioned 
above, the short-form DIT is an appropriate alternative.  Also, administering items from 
the PAI that only relate to antisocial personality factors may be a viable alternative to 
administering the entire 344-item measurement.   
Conclusion 
 
   Just as studies have linked prosocial characteristics to the development of moral 
judgment (Damon & Hart, 1988; Lifton, 1985), this study supports that important 
relationships exist between antisocial personality characteristics and aspects of moral 
judgment.  The purpose of this study was two-fold: to explore the possibility that 
antisocial personality characteristics may a) result in a failure to advance in moral 
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judgment development, and b) result in a failure to utilize one’s moral judgment ability.  
This study’s findings did not support that antisocial personality characteristics can inhibit 
moral judgment development. However, its findings indicate that antisocial personality 
characteristics can pertain to one’s thinking when it comes to making moral decisions. 
This is evidenced by the relationships seen with ANT subscales and DIT A and U scores 
as well as the findings that those with elevated ANTE scores had a tendency to respond 
on two scenarios (and potentially a third) in a way that could suggest self-serving motives.  
Overall, this study does the duty of setting the foundation for new research and creating 
the possibility for new hypotheses related to the study of moral judgment and its 
development.  This study therefore supports that the investigation of similar topics in the 
future is warranted and a worthy pursuit. 
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Demographics 
 
1.  Age: ______ years. 
 
2.  Gender (circle one):     Male         Female 
 
3.  Cumulative GPA: ______ 3.6 - 4.0 
   ______ 3.1 - 3.5   
   ______ 2.6 - 3.0 
   ______ 2.1 - 2.5 
   ______ below 2.1 
 
4. ACT score: ________   or SAT Score :  Total: _______   Verbal: ______ 
 
5.  Number of semesters in college (including junior college):  ______________ 
 
6.  Education level: ______ Freshman 
   ______ Sophomore 
   ______ Junior 
   ______ Senior 
   ______ Other: ________________________ 
 
 
7.  Ethnicity (optional):            ______ African American/Black 
     ______ American Indian or Alaska Native 
     ______ Asian 
     ______ Hispanic/Latino 
     ______ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 
     ______ White 
     ______ Other: _____________________________ 
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT (College Students) 
 
Project Title: The relationship between personality and social decision making 
Investigator:    Nathan A. Kerr. 
   Psychology Department 270-535-2080 
 nathan.kerr@wku.edu 
   
You are being asked to participate in a research project conducted through Western 
Kentucky University.  The University requires that you give your signed agreement to 
participate. 
The investigator will explain to you in detail the purpose of the research project, the 
procedures to be used, and the potential benefits and possible risks of participation.  You 
may ask him/her any questions you have to help you understand the project.  A basic 
explanation of the project is written below.  Please read this explanation and discuss with 
the researcher any questions you may have. 
If you then decide to participate in this research, please sign on the last page of this form 
in the presence of the person who explained the project to you.  You should be given a 
copy of this form to keep.  The information that follows details the parameters of this 
research project:   
 
1. Nature and Purpose of the Project:  The purpose of this research project is to 
address how specific personality factors may relate to social decision making.  
2. Explanation of Procedures:  Your participation in this study involves your 
completion of three different questionnaires.  The questionnaires to be completed ask 
participants to report demographic information, information about their thoughts 
about various social dilemmas and situations, and information about personality.  
Completing these questionnaires will take about 95 minutes.     
3. Discomfort and Risks:  There is minimal or no risk to you in participating in this 
study.  This study involves some self-disclosure, and a commitment of your time is 
also involved.   
4. Benefits:  Your participation in this research will contribute to psychological research 
by helping to better understand how specific personality factors can relate to social 
decision making. 
5. Confidentiality:  Answers and information obtained in this study will remain 
anonymous and confidential and will be used solely for the purposes of this study.  
Additionally, answers and information obtained will not be identifiable as your 
specific answers.  If you should become uncomfortable at any time, you have the 
right to discontinue your participation, and your answers will be removed from the 
study.  You also have the option to refuse to answer any question and remain in the 
study.  Only group data will appear in any reports of this study.   
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6. Refusal/Withdrawal:  Refusal to participate in this study in full or in part will have 
no effect on any future services you may be entitled to from the University.  Anyone 
who agrees to participate is free to withdraw from the study at any time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If you have read and understand the parameters of this study and wish to participate, 
please sign below after reading the following statement:  
 
I understand the conditions set forth above, and I agree to participate in this study.  I 
also understand that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental 
procedure and believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both the 
known and potential but unknown risks. 
 
 
__________________________________________ _______________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
__________________________________________ _______________ 
Witness        Date 
 
THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT 
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY 
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD 
Dr. Phillip E. Myers, Human Protections Administrator 
TELEPHONE:  (270) 745-4652
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Informed Consent Document (Prisoners)
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT (Prisoners) 
 
Project Title: The relationship between personality and social decision making 
Investigator:    Nathan A. Kerr. 
   Psychology Department 270-535-2080 
 nathan.kerr@wku.edu 
   
You are being asked to join in a research project made by Western Kentucky 
University.  Before taking part of this study, the University will ask you to sign your 
name in agreement. 
The investigator will tell you what this project is for, what you will be doing, how 
this project helps, and if there is any risk for you.  You are welcome to ask him/her any 
questions you have to help you understand the project.  A simple explanation of the 
project is written below.  Please read this explanation and talk with the researcher about 
any questions you may have. 
If you then choose that you want to be in this project, please sign on the last page 
of this form in front of the person who explained the project to you.  You should be given 
a copy of this form to keep.  The information below talks about this research project:   
 
1. Nature and Purpose of the Project:  The idea of this project is to look at how 
someone’s personality may relate to their decisions in a social setting.  
2. Explanation of Procedures:  To be a part of this study, you will need to complete 
three different surveys.  The questionnaires to be completed ask participants to report 
background information, information about their thoughts about various social 
situations, and information about personality.  Completing these questionnaires will 
take about 95 minutes.     
3. Discomfort and Risks:  There is little to no risk to you being a part of this study.  
This study will ask you to reveal some of your personal information, and a 
commitment of your time is also involved.   
4. Benefits:  Your presence in this research will help lead to a better understanding of 
how people’s personality can relate to their decisions in social settings. 
5. Confidentiality:  Answers and information that we get in this study will be kept 
secret and will be used only for the purposes of this study.  Also, answers and 
information obtained will not be seen as your specific answers.  If you should feel 
uncomfortable at any time, you have the right to stop your participation, and your 
answers will be removed from the study.  You also have the option to refuse to 
answer any question and remain in the study.  Only group data will appear in any 
reports of this study.   
6. Refusal/Withdrawal:  Deciding to not participate in this study in full or in part will 
not keep you from any future services offered from the University.  Anyone who 
agrees to be a part of this study is free to withdraw from the study at any time. 
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If you have read and understand the risks and benefits of this study and wish to 
participate, please sign below after reading the following statement:  
 
I understand the purpose of this study, and I agree to participate.  I also understand that 
it is not possible to identify all of the possible risks  and believe that efforts have been 
taken to lower the chances of any risks. 
 
 
__________________________________________ _______________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
__________________________________________ _______________ 
Witness        Date 
 
THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT 
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY 
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD 
Dr. Phillip E. Myers, Human Protections Administrator 
TELEPHONE:  (270) 745-4652 
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